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STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Appellant, Louis G. Tryfonas, appeals the grand lar-
ceny conviction rendered against him. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Louis G. Tryfonas was convicted of grand larceny in 
the District Court of Utah County, State of Utah, Honorable 
Allen B. Sorensen, presiding, on February 11, 1970. He 
was sentenced to an indeterminate term of not less than one 
or more than ten years in the Utah State Prison. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks to have the grand larceny conviction 
affirmed. 
2 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Respondent accepts the statement of facts as made bv 
the appellant except as hereafter noted. · 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE TRIAL COURT FOUND SUFFICIENT 
EVIDENCE TO ESTABLISH THE CRIME OF 
"LARCENY OF A COW" AS DEFINED BY 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-38-4 (1953) AND PROP-
ERLY DENIED APPELLANT'S MOTION TO 
DISMISS. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-38-4 (1953) defines the crime of 
grand larceny : 
"Grand larceny is committed in either of the 
following cases: 
(1) When the property taken is of value ex· 
ceeding $50. 
(2) When the property taken is from the per· 
son of another. 
( 3) When the property taken is a horse, mare, 
colt, gelding, cow, heifer, steer, ox, bull, calf, sheep, 
goat, mule, jack or jenny." (Emphasis added.) 
The thrust of this section of the Code is to provide a 
distinction between grand larceny and petit larceny as Jar· 
ceny itself is defined in Utah Code Ann. § 76-38-1 (1953). 
There is no question raised as to whether or not there was 
in fact a " ... felonious stealing, taking, carrying, leading 
or driving away the personal property of another." Id. 
This is more than adequately shown by the facts in the 
Record when considered in light of the presumption that 
a prima facie case is made out when the person in posses-
sion of stolen property, " ... fails to make a satisfactory 
explanation." Id. 
The question presented directly to the court on this 
appeal is whether or not there was adequate evidence pre-
sented to establish the crime of larceny of a cow. This re-
lates specifically to the determination that appellant com-
mitted a crime of sufficient severity so as to come within 
the provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 76-38-4 (1953). The 
intent of the legislature in enacting the provisions of the 
grand larceny statute relating to livestock was examined 
in In re Gannett, 11 Utah 283, 39 P. 496 (1895). There 
the court said : 
"It is evident that the legislature, by the enact-
ment of 1886, intended to provide a punishment for 
certain offenses against live stock, which were akin 
to stealing, but technically were not larceny, and 
which were not covered by the general law relating 
to larceny." Id. at 289, 39 P. 497. 
* * * 
"It is quite apparent that it has been the settled 
policy of the legislature to make live stock a subject 
of grand larceny .... " Id. at 290, 39 P. 498. 
The indication is clear that the legislature felt that 
the taking of livestock and specifically a cow was a serious 
enough offense that it should always constitute the crime 
of grand larceny as opposed to petit larceny. 
J 
Appellant contends that a cow ceases to be a co, 
1 v w en 
it is no longer alive. This distinction is frivolous in light 
of the purpose of the grand larceny statute and in light 
of the usefulness of a cow. The statutes' purpose has been 
to punish those persons taking a cow with the same penalty 
as those who would take property of a value in excess of 
$50. The value of a cow does not come into question. 
The usefulness of a cow in the hands of its true owner 
ceases at the time the cow is taken whether it is taken dead 
or alive. Certainly no distinction can be seen between steal-
ing or killing and stealing from the standpoint of the true 
owner. From the thief's viewpoint, the true utility of the 
cow might be that of using it as meat or beef and not as a 
source of milk or breeding. There can be no real distinc-
tions made between taking a cow and killing it and taking 
a cow and keeping it alive. In both cases, the true owner 
is deprived of his property and the thief benefits from the 
use of the cow no matter what he views that use to be. 
Appellant contends that the rule of law in Utah is that 
the evidence must prove that the cow be alive at the time 
of the taking and that the evidence show that the defendant 
actually killed the cow_ The holding in State v. Laub, 102 
Utah 402, 131 P. 2d 805 (1942) does not in fact require 
that such proof be made. The court said: 
". . . [ W] here the anmal is killed as a means 
of making the theft possible, the crime of grand 
larceny is complete just as much as if it had been 
loaded on a truck alive and taken away ... · If the 
person seeking to steal it shot it in order to catch 
it, the crime of grand larceny would be made out at 
tr 
brr 
,, 
~he Lrnc !~ w 1·; taken into pcssession. The killing or 
shCJotii':~· was !wt the m;mner chosen to obtain pos-
1:e~c:;on.' Id. at 407, 131 P. 2d 807. 
The rnl'i't indicat2<l t!1at foe killing of <• cow could be 
the basi.c; i;-: ·· t 11e felonious taking in grand larceny, provid-
ing all ti 1 ~ c~c;nents of the crime were met. The death of 
the animal diJ not affect the conviction for grand larceny. 
AppeJlant mges that the killing of the cow actually 
becomes an element of the crime under the Laub decision. 
Sud1 a contention does not square with the holding of the 
case. The defendant Laub and two others were convicted 
of grand larceny after the evidence showed the following 
facts. 
"The evidence set out above almost conclusively 
shows that someone killed a calf belonging to Charles 
Foster and took the carcass. The attempt made to 
destroy marks of identification on the hide and re-
mains of the calf is inconsistent with any hypothesis 
except that the person disposing of the hide, etc. 
had a guilty mind and was trying to conceal his 
crime. This calf was killed in the vicinity of Round-
Up Flat on or about October 9, 1941. 
* * * 
" ... They (the defendants) were all together 
with Cannon in Round-Up Flat at or near the time 
of the commission of the crime. They had in their 
truck several burlap sacks - sacks similar to those 
in which the remains of the calf were found. Their 
conduct when they first saw the Trumans was one 
of hesitancy, showing surprise and reluctance to be 
discovered. They had fresh blood in quantity upon 
their hands and clothes. Laub carried a rifle." Id. 
at 408-409, 131 P. 2d 808. (Emphasis added.) 
6 
If in fact the Laub decision requires that the animal 
be killed by those taking the animal, the evidence in Laub 
does not meet its own legal test. Circumstantially there 
was an indication that Laub and his friends might have 
killed the calf but the evidence in the case at bar is just as 
strong in proving that Tryfonas in fact killed the cow. 
Assuming that Laub requires that a killing be shown, 
the following facts meet the same circumstantial evidence 
test that Laub applied in finding a killing. Tryfonas was 
seen dragging part of the cow away from the car as his 
partner slammed the lid of the trunk ( T. 5) . Both Tryfonas 
and his friend ran when seeing the red spot light (T. 5). 
A rifle was found in the car (T. 22). Appellant Tryfonas, 
after being advised of his rights, voluntarily called out, 
"Merl, come on up. They have caught us" (T. 14). The 
cow was later properly identified as belonging to someone 
other than Tryfonas ( T. 36) . 
The circumstantial evidence before the Court in this 
case is very similar to that found in Laub. The conviction 
for grand larceny was affirmed in Laub and should like· 
wise be affirmed in the case at bar. This is especially true 
when viewed in light of the provisions of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-38-1 (1953) which state that a prima facie case of 
larceny is made out when a person is found with stolen 
property and fails to make a satisfactory explanation. 
It should also be pointed out that in an earlier Utah 
case, State v. Church, 54 Utah 533, 182 P. 218 (1919), the 
-
• 
facts showed that Church was not present when his stepson 
killed a steer. The defendant, Church, did aid in slaughter-
ing and concealing the killing of the steer and was still con-
Yictecl of larceny of a steer. With this case as precedent 
for La11b, it would be foolish to suggest that proof must be 
offered tn show that defendant actually killed the animal in 
order to sustain a larceny conviction. 
POINT II. 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY INSTRUCTED 
THE JURY AS TO WHAT ELEMENTS CON-
STITUTE THE CRIME OF "LARCENY OF A 
COW" AS SET FORTH IN UTAH CODE ANN. 
§ 76-38-4 (1953). 
Appellant contends in connection with Point I of his 
brief that a cow must be alive or be killed by the defendant 
in order to be a cow within the meaning of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-38-4 (1953). Appellant urges this Court to require 
that a jury be instructed with such a definition. 
The contention made is without merit in light of the 
distinctions made relating to the Laub case as discussed 
in Respondent's Point I. The proper standards for jury 
instructions were clearly set forth in the Church decision 
relating directly to this area of the law. Counsel for the 
defendant in Church urged that the jury was not properly 
instructed and that the following jury instruction should 
have been given. 
"You are instructed that defendant would t 
be guilty of grand larceny, the offense cl"1.<ergedn~f 
he had nothing to do whether di1·ectly 01· indire~tly 
with the steer, prior to its death, and at the immed-
iate time of its killing, even though, after its death 
he helped dress the same and appropriated wme of 
the meat for his own use, for merely d1·e,·:sing the 
animal and appropriating the meat is net grand 
larceny on the part of the defendant unless he con-
nived, aided, and abetted in its taking and killing." 
State v. Church, 54 Utah 533, 540, 182 P. 218, 221 
(1919). 
The court found no error in refusing to submit such 
an instruction to the jury. The conviction in Church was 
affirmed. 
Appellant urges that this Court require that a similar 
jury instruction be submitted as was suggested in Church. 
For the reasons previously explained regarding the killing 
of a cow in connection with its taking such an irn;truction 
should not be required in the case at bar. This would agree 
entirely with the holding in the Church and Laub cases 
as have been discussed. 
CONCLUSION 
The evidence presented at trial was sufficient to show 
the commission of the crime of grand larceny. The grand 
larceny statute treating animals as subjects of grand Jar· 
ceny should be construed as specifying an alternative to 
valuation made at the express will of the legislature. 
.. 
The Laub and Church cases both fit squarely with the 
facts of this case and their holdings should be binding on 
this Court in affirming a conviction for grand larceny 
where there was circumstantial evidence to show that 
Tryfonas actually killed the cow. 
Respectfully submitted, 
VERNON B. ROMNEY 
Attorney General 
LAUREN N. BEASLEY 
Chief Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
